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[erim. No. 5761. In Bank. Jan. 27, 1956]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MABEL MALOTTE,
Appellant.
[1] Privacy-What Oonstitutes Violation of &t,ht.-Wbeu a per-

(2]

[S]

[4]

[6)

son discusses the commission of a crime with another, face
to face or at a distance through the use of any meaus of
communication, there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy
when the' other uses the conversation against him.
Telegraphs and Telephones-Crimes.- Where a conversation
was recorded by police officers at the moment it reached the
intended receiver, there was no interccption within the meaning of the Federal Communications Act, § 605, prohibiting
any person not authorized by the sender to intercept any eommunication and divulge or publish the existence, contents.
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted
communication to anyone.
Id.-Crimes.-There is no learning of the contents of acommunication "fraudulently. clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner" in violation of Pen. Code, § 640, prohibiting tapping or an unauthorized connection with a
telegraph or telephone line, when one participant to the eon·
versation consents to or directs its oyerhearing or preservation.
Oriminal La.w - Defenses - Entrapment.-Where an accused
had a preexisting criminal intE'nt, the fact that when .olicited
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of un·
lawful entrapment.
Id.-InBtructions-Defenses-EntrapJll,ent.-Where there is a
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no
instruction on the subjE'ct need be given.

[1) Right of privacy, notes. 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446, 14
A.L.R.2d 750. See also Cal.Jur. lO-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Privacy,
§ 2; Am.Jur., Privacy, 120 et seq.
[2) See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, 533 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, 1 65.
[4) Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment there·
for, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263. See also
Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, 1200 et seq.; Am.JUl•• Criminal Law,
§304.

Melt. Dig. References: [lJ Privacy, 12; [2,3) Telegraphs and
Telephones, §4;[4] Criminal Law, 550; [5] Criminal Law, §761.
[6, 9] Conspiracy, § 5; (7] Conspiracy, § 3; [8] Criminal Law,
§ 58: [10) Municipal Corporations, § 237.
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[8] Oonspfracy-Criminal- Particular Oonspiracies.-Defendant
was Dot improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate a
municipal police code section prohibiting an offer or agreement to commit an act of prostitution on the ground that she
could only be charged with a conspiracy to violate another
municipal police code section prohibiting one from soliciting
any person for the purpose of prostitution, since the two code
sections set forth separate offenses, the first making the offer
or agreement one's own, while the other relates to solicitation
for another.
[7] Id.-Criminal-Overt Act.-A conspirator does not have to
participate in the crime conspired.
[8] Criminal Law-Principals-Aiders and Abetters.-Conspiracy
is not synonymous with aiding or abetting or participating;
it implies an agreement to commit a crime, while to aid and
abet requires actual participation in the act constituting the
offense.
[9] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Pen. Code,
§ 182, occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a conspiracy "to commi.t any crime," and in prescribing the punishment for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, DO distinction
is drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinances
and those defined by statute.
[10] Municipal Oorporations - Ordinances - Oonflict With Statutes.-Although the Legislature can make exceptions to the
statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative bodies cannot.
(Const., art. XI, § 11.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying a new trial. John B. Molinari, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for conspiring to commit a misdemeanor and
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
Leslie C. Gillen and John R. Golden for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney Gencral, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Mabel Malotte appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of
conspiring to commit a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 182),
and of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Welf.
" Inst. Code, § 702.) She also appeals from the order deny.iDe her motion for a new trial.
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On March 10, 1954, Frank Lombardi, at the request of
the police, made a telephone call from the district attorney's
office in San Francisco. He identified himself and said,
"Say, listen Mabel; a friend of mine will be in town tonight,
and he will call you. His name is Leonard Windsor. Can
you take care of him'" This telephone caU was not recorded
and the officers present were unable to hear the party at the
other end of the line.
At about 8 o'clock that night Inspectors o 'Haire and
McGuire of the San Francisco Police Department went to
room 712 at the Sir Francis Drake Hotel, where they had
previously registered. They placed a recording apparatus
under one of the beds and connected it to an induction coil,
a device designed to overhear a telephone conversation without the necessity of malting physical connection with the telephone electrical circuit. Inspector 0 'Haire then placed a call
to Prospect 6-3267, and defendant answered. Their conversation was as follows:
"Hello.
"Is this Mrs. Malotte!
"Yes.
"Ub-this is-uh-Leonarcl Windsor.
"Yes.
"Ub-Mr. Frank Lombardi told me to get in touch with
you this evening.
"Yes; he told me.
"He did!
"Yes.
"Well, I'm staying up at-uh-Sir Franeis Drake, room
712.
"All right.
"And-uh-I have my friend, Mr. Bacei.
"Ub-no, he didn't. But I'll-I'll take care of it. What's
the name, did you say f
"Bacci.
"All right. I'll-uh-what time do you want them, right
nowf
"Well, not right at the moment. In about an hour, half
an hour, an hour.
"That'l1 be fine. All right, I'll take eare of it.
"Yes, what time shall we expect them, in half an hour, an
hourT
"In about an hour will be fine.
"An bourf
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"Yes.
•• All right.
"Okay.
"All right.
"Bye."
About an hour after the telephone eall Yola Boles, a
minor, came to the hotel room and introduced Lerself as
Adele. The second girl failed to appear, and Yola gave the
officers another telephone number, which they caned to ask
about the delay. Defendant also answered this call and told
them tbat tbe otber girl would be along in a few minutes.
In tbe meantime, Mary Madsen, tbe other girl, thinking'
she saw a plainclothesman following ber, called defendant
for instructions. Defendant called tbe botel room and asked
to speak to "Adele," but was told tbat she was occupied.
Mary again called defendant, as sbe bad been instructed
to do on her previous call, and was told that tbere was
nothing wrong and to go on up. Mary, however, refused to
enter tbe botel unescorted. Defendant told her to call the
room and bave the customer come down to meet her. Mary
called tbe room, asked 0 'Haire to come down, and asked him
to call defendant. 0 'Haire made the call and was told by
defendant, "Well, I have tbe girl on the other pbone now
and she will meet you across the street in the Owl Drug
Store. " None of these subsequent calls were recorded, nor
were they overheard by anyone except the parties thereto.
Inspector 0 'Haire met Mary at the Owl Drug Store and
returned with her to the room. Tbe girls were paid $2!'i
eacb. They disrobed and got into the beds. The officers
took badges from their luggage, identified themselves as of.
ficers, and placed the girls under arrest. Tben they went to
defendant's apartment and waited outside overnight until
a warrant could be secured for her arrest. When they securec'l
the warrant, tbey demanded admittance, explained their
purpose, and forced the door when she refused to answer
(See Pen. Code, § 844.) Tbey found ber hiding in the attic.
Defendant contends that the evidence of the recorded phont'
call was inadmissible on the ground that it was obtained in
violation of her constitutional rigbts and in violation of
federal and California statutes. She maintains that with·
out the interpretation the recorded call gives to the sub·
sequent transactions no conspiracy is established, leavintr in·
admissible tbe extrajudicial acts and declarations of tbe girls.
alleged coconspirators, and uncorroborated Mary's testimony,

)
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(·oncerning her agreement with defendant to serve 81 •
prostitute for her.
The attorney general, relying on Olmstead v. United 8ItJl68,
277 U.S. 438 [48 8.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376], and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 [62 S.Ot. 993, 86
hEd. 1322], contends that the overhearing of the telephone
conversation by means of the induction coil was not a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section
19, of the California Constitution. It is unnecessary to determine whether those cases have been unsettled by lrt!ine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 [74 8.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], for
there is a basic difference between the conduct of the officers
in that case and the conduct of Inspectors 0 'Haire and
McGuire, herein. In the Irvine case there were several trespasses when the microphone was installed and subsequently
moved in the Irvine home, and an "incredible" invasion of
the right to privacy through the .eavesdropping over the
microphone. The officers monitored indiscriminately not only
the conversations pertaining to gambling, but those involving
every phase of the Irvine's personal affairs. The technique
used by the officers made selectivity impossible. In the present case there was neither trespass nor indiscriminate eavesdropping. Unlike the Irvine case, nothing was overheard
but the free discussion of a crime by one who thought her
listener a client. [1] When a person discusses the commission of a crime with another, face to face or at a distance
through the use of any mf'.aDS of communication, there is no
unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other uses the
conversation against him.
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Federal Communications Act (47
U.S.C.A. § 605), and section 640 of the California Penal Code
and that it was, therefore, inadmissible under the rule of
People v. Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides:
". . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person; ... " A
majority of the federal courts define "intercept" as used in
section 605 to mean "to take or seize by'the way, or before
arrival at the destined place," and hold that there is no interception when the iutended receiver consents to or directs the

)
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overhearing of the communication at the moment it reaches
him. (United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F.Supp. 69, 70;
United States v. Lewis, 87 F.Supp, 970, 973, reversed on
other grounds suo nom. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394; .
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F.Supp. 480, 482 j United States.
Y. Pierce, 124 F.Supp. 264, 267; and see dissent of Clark, J. to
United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 891; ct. United
Stales v. Polakoff, supra, 112 F.2d 888, 889 j United States v.
StcphensO'll, 121 F.Supp. 274, 277.) The United States Supreme Court, approving this definition in the Goldman case,
supra, 316 U. S. 129, 134, went on to say: "[Intercept] does
not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent
before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the
possession of the intended receiver." (See Reitmeister v.
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691.) [2] Thus, as in the present.
case, where the conversation was recorded by the officers" at
the moment" it reached the "intended receiver," there was
no interception within the meaning of section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act. [3] There was likewise no
invasion of privacy in violation of section 640 of the Penal
Code. 1 There is no learning of the contents of a communication "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner" when one of the participants to the conversation
consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation. (See
People v. Channel, 107 Ca1.App.2d 192, 200 [236 P.2d 654].)
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. A substantial part of the conversation between Frank Lombardi
and defendant, and all of that between Inspector 0 'Haire
and defendant is quoted above. Neither conversation, nor
any testimony brought' out at the trial by defendant or the
People shows more than the creation of an opportunity for
defendant to act on her preexisting criminal intent.
[4] "Where an accused has a preexisting criminal intent,
"'Ever,y person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or eon·
trlvanee, or in an,. other maDDer, willfully and fraudulently, or elan·
destinely taps, or makes any wiautborized eonneetion with any telegraph
or telephone wire, line, eable, or instrument under the eontrol of any
telegraph or telephone company; or who willfully and fraudulently, or
clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized maDDer, reads, or attempts
to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or
eo=unication while the same is in transit or passing over any telegraph or telephone wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or
reeeivecl at any plaee within this State ••• , ia punishable [b1 fine and
impriaoJament.] "
.
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the fact that when solicited by a decoy he committed a crime
raises no inference of unlawful entrapment." (PeopZe ...
Schwartz, 109 Oal.App.2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024], quoted
with approval in PeopZe v. Braddock, 41 Oal.2d 794,802 [264
P.2d 521].) [5] Thus, as in this case, where there is a
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no
instruction on the subject need be given. (People v. Alamillo,
113 Oal.App.2d 617, 621 [248 P.2d 421] ; People v. Ja.ck.on,
106 Oal.App.2d 114, 125 [234 P.2d 766]; People v. Bt14"ris,
80 Oal.App. 328, 331 [251 P. 823].)
[6] Defendant also contends that even if we admit the
evidence to which she objects, the judgment must be reversed
on the ground that she was improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate section 240, subdivision (a), of the Police
Oode of San Francisco. She claims that section 2252 of the
Police Oode defines the same offense as does section 240,· and
IUgUes that since section 225 provides a lesser penalty, she
can only be charged with a conspiracy to violate that section.
The two sections set forth separate offenses. One can solicit
for another (§ 225), but the offer or agreement to commit an
act of prostitution is one's own. (§ 240, subd. (a).) [7] Defendant contends that if the sections are not the same, and
if section 240, subdivision (a), is construed as referring to an
act of prostitution to be committed by the one making the
offer or agreement, the evidence shows only a conspiracy to
violate section 225 and not section 240, subdivision (a), since
she did not offer or agree to commit an act of prostitution.
The answer to this contention is that a conspirator does not
have to participate in the crime conspired.
Finally, defendant contends that the felony charge was
improper and that she should have been sentenced and convicted for a misdemeanor only, on the ground that subsection
(g) of section 240 of the Police Oode, 1Vhich makes it a misdemeanor to aid or abet or participate in the doing of any of
the acts prohibited by section 240, should be construed as
prohibiting a conspiracy to violate section 240. [8] Conspiracy', however, is not synonymous with aiding or abetting
or participating. Conspiracy implies an agreement to commit
a crime; to aid and abet requires actual participation in the

)

lI'It maD be 1Dllawful tor RD7 pellOD on RD7 public atreet or ~hwa7
or elaewhere, to lolicit, 117 word, act, gesture, knock. 81m or otherwille, Ill)' person tor the purpoae of prostitution."
"'Eve17 pelIOn 11 cuiltJ of • miademeanor who: (.) OfreJ'll • ~
to eoaunit RD7 lewd or iD4ecent act or RD7 act of p. .
•
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act constituting the offense. (People v. BOM, 13 Ca1.App.•
175 [109 P. 150].) [9] Moreover, section 182 of the Penal
Code occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a conspir- i
acy "to commit any crime." In prescribing the punishment
for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction is
drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinance and
those defined by statute. The case of In re Williamson, 43
Cal.2d 651 [276 P.2d 593], holding section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code, dealing with conspiracies to i
violate certain licensing provisions of that code, to be an
exception to the general conspiracy provisions of section 182'
of the Penal Code, is not in point, for section 240, subdivision
{g), of the Police Code of San Francisco cannot be considered
such an exception. [10] Although the Legislature can make
exceptions to the statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative
bodies cannot. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 11; Pipoly v. Benson,
20 Ca1.2d 366, 370 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515], and cases
cited therein.) Thus, defendant was properly charged with
and convicted of a felony.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
I

Shenk, J., Spence. J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed
for failure to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.
There is evidence in the record which would support a verdict
based on that defense. The police officers induced Frank
Lombardi, a friend of defendant, to solicit her to commit the
criminal act here involved.
The police officer involved in the entrapment testified:
"Q. You, either alone or with the assistance of someone
else conceived the idea of setting into motion a set of circumstances to cause someone to eommit a crime, iBn't that
correcU • . • A. Yes."
After the solicitation by Lombardi the police officers posed
as decoys and made further solicitation of defendant whi'cb .:.
culminated in the consummation of the crime. The jury could I
have concluded that the police originated and set in motion a
scheme to cause defendant to commit a crime. This could be
interpreted to mean that regardless of the innocent or guilty
frame of mind of the victim, the police sought to cause her to
commit a crime. This purpose was carried out, the first step
being a telephone call by Lombardi to defendant asking her
to violate the law. In Cline v. United Stat6l, 20 F.2d 494,

)
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defendant procured a narcotic for a dope addict upon the
Ilolicitation of the latter whom be knew and who was acting
in fear of the police in making the solicitation. The court
held there was entrapment as a matter of law. In United
States v. Eman Mfg, Co., 271 F. 353, the government agent,
pretending to be a customer for defendant's medicinal prod.
uct, "Su1£ox," wrote to defendant asking it to send bim
some. Defendant did so but misbranded the Su1£ox which
constituted a violation of the food and drug laws when the
article was placed in interstate commerce. The court held
there was entrapment. In People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal.App.
425 [290 P. 504], the officers had Dan, an addict and seller
of drugs, solicit defendant, an addict, to buy drugs. The
drug was left on the street, and, at DaB's request, defendant
paid for it and picked it up whereupon he was arrested for
illegal possession. The judgment of conviction was reversed
for failure to instruct on entrapment, the court stating
(p. 429): "It must be borne in mind that appellant was not
charged with having sold or bargained to sen any drugs; nor
was any evidence whatever introduced to show that such was
his intention. The present case, therefore, is quite different
from those upon which respondent seems to rely, showing that
a defendant was already in the illegal possession of an article.
but was entrapped into selling it. In the case at bar the
theory of appellant's defense was that the possession by him
of said drug was brought about solely through the instrumentalities of the state's agent and those working under him.
for the very purpose of causing his arrest. As said in the
case of In re Moore, 70 Cal.App. 483 [233 P. 805, 806], 'It
may be conceded that it would be violative of sound public
policy and repugnant to good morals to uphold the conviction
of a person who, being entirely innocent of any intention to
commit a crime, was inveigled into its commission by an
officer of the law or by a private detective hired for that
purpose by some self-constituted guardian of the public
morals. (People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal.App. 25 [171 P. 440].)' ..
My views on entrapment were expressed in my dissent in
People v. Braddock, 41 CaJ.2d 794. 803 r264 P.2d 521].
For the foregoing reason 1 would reverse the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
21, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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